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COMMUNITY-PROPERTY TREATMENT




The underlying policy of modern community-property law is to
recognize the mutual nature of the economic contributions that a hus-
band and wife make to a marriage, regardless of whether one or both
spouses work outside the home.' This policy not only provides the ba-
sis for the division of property on divorce and death but also supports
an integrated system for the management of a married couple's prop-
erty during the existence of a marriage. Consequently, community-
property concepts govern most property related transactions conducted
by either spouse during marriage as well as the disposition of property
at the termination of the marriage. This integrated policy is reflected
in the central unifying rule of community property that property ac-
quired during a marriage through the labor and industry of either
spouse is presently owned by both spouses in two undivided shares.2
Some community-property jurisdictions recognize, in addition, that the
rents and profits of separate property are community property when
the rights to such rents and profits are acquired during the marriage.3
* Associate Professor, University of Idaho College of Law; B.A., The College of
Wooster, 1979; J.D., Case Western Reserve University, 1982. I wish to acknowledge the
thoughtful comments of Professors Mark Anderson and James Macdonald on aspects of
this article. I also appreciate the helpful research assistance of Yvonne Leveque and
Dawn Reynolds.
1. W. DEFUNIAK AND M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, § 2 (2d ed.
1971) [hereinafter DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN]. DeFuniak & Vaughn explain that this central
principle of community property arises from the civil-law notion that marriage created a
partnership-like relationship between husband and wife, in contrast to the common-law
notion that upon marriage, husband and wife merged into one. See also W. McCLANA-
HAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, § 2:19-2:29 (1982) [hereinafter Mc-
CLANAHAN]. But see Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution
Fails, 68 Tax. L. REv. 689 (1990) [hereinafter Smith].
2. DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 1, at'§ 1; MCCLANAHAN, supra note 1, at § 2:29.
3. Idaho, Texas, Louisiana and Wisconsin, commonly referred to as "Civil Rule"
jurisdictions, recognize that rents and profits of separate property are community prop-
erty. See IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (1983); TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15, as amended 1987; LA.
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This recognition, based on the original Spanish antecedents to Ameri-
can community-property law, revolves in part around the idea that
such rents and profits are the result of community labor and industry
and in part around the idea that married persons, having the economic
well-being of the marriage in mind, would naturally contribute rents
and profits to the marital community.' The community's claim 5 does
not extend, in any jurisdiction, to "natural increases" in the value of
community property resulting from appreciation or inflation.s
Determining whether a community-property interest exists in the
increase in value7 of a separate-property business has presented many
problems for community-property jurisdictions. These problems in-
clude: 1) determining whether some of the increase in value is attribu-
table to the labor of one of the spouses and/or to rents and profits from
one spouse's separate property, 2) characterizing and valuing whatever
interest the community may have, and 3) adopting a fair and realistic
method of satisfying the claims of the non-owner spouse once an inter-
est is identified and valued.
In this article, the author will first argue that the community has
two potential claims to the increase in value of a separate-property
business. Most community-property jurisdictions recognize that the
non-owner spouse may have a claim that some of the increase in value
is attributable to community labor and industry and therefore consti-
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2339 (West 1985); Wis. STAT. § 766.31(4) (West Supp. 1990). Such a
claim does not exist in the "American Rule" jurisdictions of Washington, California, New
Mexico, Nevada and Arizona which do not generally recognize a community-property
interest in the rents and profits of separate property. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-213
(1976); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (West 1983); NEV. Rav. STAT. § 123.130 (1986);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26-16-010 and 26-16-020 (1989).
This distinction probably originated with the early California decision, George v. Ran-
som, 15 Cal. 322 (1860). See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 1 at § 71.
4. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 1, at § 2:29; DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 1, at §
71.
5. "The community" is not an entity with separate legal status. In this article, the
term "the community" will be used as a shorthand way of discussing the common undi-
vided property interest owned by the spouses in property acquired during a marriage
and the claim that one spouse may have for the distribution of community property
upon the termination of the marriage.
6. See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 1, § 73 at 169-70.
7. In this article, the term "increase in value" in a separate-property business re-
fers to gross increases in the value of the business assets which are not distributed. This
type of increase may not be reflected in an increase in market price of the stock of an
incorporated business. Since there is frequently no market for the stock of these busi-




tutes community property.8 Furthermore, in Civil Rule jurisdictions,
the community has a claim to the increase in value attributable to un-
paid rents and profits on the separate property.9 Although most of the
cases addressing this problem contain common themes, no consistent
recognition of community and separate interests in the increase in
value of separate-property businesses has emerged. Second, the author
will discuss the various tests used to value the two community-prop-
erty claims.'0 Finally, the author will propose a method of valuing
these claims and a method for recognizing and characterizing the un-
realized community interest in the increase in value of a separate-prop-
erty business on the termination of the marital community by either
divorce or death."
II. THE NATURE OF THE COMMUNITY INTEREST IN THE
INCREASE IN VALUE OF A SEPARATE-PROPERTY BUSINESS.
The most basic tenet of community-property law is that income
resulting from the labor and industry of the spouses during marriage is
community property. 2 Problems in applying this rule arise, however,
when one spouse owns a share of a business which is that spouse's sep-
arate property and contributes labor and effort to the business. Such a
business could be separate property because it was acquired or incor-
porated prior to marriage; was acquired by one of the spouses during
marriage by gift, devise or inheritance; or was acquired during the mar-
riage in exchange for separate property.3 In any case, no matter how
8. See infra, notes 17 - 27 and accompanying text. All community-property juris-
dictions theoretically recognize the community interest in property which is acquired
through the labor and industry of either of the spouses. Texas has recognized that a
spouse may be permitted to contribute some de minimis amount of labor to maintain the
value of that spouse's separate property and that such labor does not create a commu-
nity interest in the separate property. Cf. Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W. 2d
676 (1953).
9. See infra notes 12 - 49 and accompanying text.
10. See infra, notes 50 - 105 and accompanying text.
11. See infra, notes 106 - 125 and accompanying'text.
12. 'See DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 1, at § 1; MCCLANAHAN, supra note 1, at
§ 2:29.
13. All of the community-property jurisdictions treat property acquired before the
marriage and property acquired during the marriage by one of the spouses as a result of
gift, devise or inheritance as the separate property of the acquiring spouse. See ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1976); CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 5107 and 5108 (West 1983); LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 2341 (West 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § .123.130 (1986); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-3-8 (1989); TEXAS CONST. art. XVI § 15, as amended 1987; Wis. STAT. § 766.31




the spouse acquires the property, the community may be deprived of
property while the net worth and profitability of the separate-property
business may be enhanced if the owner-spouse does not receive a rea-
sonable salary and/or the business does not distribute profits.1'
The decision of the owner-spouse to undercompensate himself or
herself and/or to not distribute profits may not necessarily be the re-
sult of selfish or bad-faith motives. Rather, the decision may be based
on the exercise of reasonable and informed business judgment for the
purpose of getting the business underway, getting it through a tight
financial situation or helping it grow. In other words, the decisions of
the owner-spouse may be the type any entrepreneur would make in
nurturing a business. However, if the community's claims based on the
underpayment of salary and/or the retention of profits are not recog-
nized, then one spouse will be permitted to make a unilateral gift of
community property to the benefit of his or her separate property.
Such a gift would fly in the face of the basic tenets of community-
property law.1"
If the business does not turn a profit, then the community does
not have a claim. The community-property interest only attaches to
income and profits which are actually produced. Certainly the commu-
nity would not be able to claim that one of the spouses could have
found a better paying job during the marriage, and therefore, a court
should recognize a community claim in the earnings that the working
spouse did-not realize."6 Neither would the community have a claim if
14. Congress has provided some disincentive for corporations to accumulate earn-
ings in the form of a punitive tax on such earnings. 26 U.S.C. § 531 et seq. (1988); dis-
cussed in B. BITTKER AND J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 8.01-8.24 (5th ed. 1987).
15. California, Nevada, Louisiana, Idaho and Washington require the consent of
both spouses before one spouse may make a gift of community property to a third party.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(2) (1989); Anderson v. Idaho Mutual Ben. Ass'n., 77 Idaho
373, 292 P.2d 760 (1956); Koenig v. Bishop, 90 Idaho 182,409 P.2d 102 (1965); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 123.230(2) (1986); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (b) (West 1983); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art.
2349 (West 1985). Texas, Arizona, New Mexico and Wisconsin allow a manager spouse to
make only "reasonable and moderate" gifts of community property. Horlock v. Horlock,
533 S.W. 2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), writ dismissed; Gaethje v. Gaethje, 8 Ariz. App.
47, 442 P.2d 870 (1968); J. WOOD, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW OF NEW MEXIco 82
(1954); WIs. STAT. § 766.536 (West Supp. 1990).
16. The only way that such a claim could be advanced is if the spouse had a claim
in a future stream-of-income, either earned or unearned, such as by acquiring a property
interest in a degree or license. Community-property jurisdictions however, have thus far
declined to recognize such interests. See e.g. Muckleroy v. Muckelroy, 84 N.M. 14, 498
P.2d 1357 (1972). California has enacted a statute giving the non-degree/license spouse a
claim. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1987). Some community-property jurisdic-
tions have recognized that the good will of a professional practice may be community
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the business venture of the owner-spouse fails. However, where the
business of the owner-spouse increases in value, the community should
be entitled to the value of labor and industry contributed towards the
generation of those profits and, in Civil Rule jurisdictions, the profits
themselves.
Courts have been willing to recognize that some of the increase in
value of a separate-property business may be attributable to the labor
and industry of one of the spouses, primarily in cases where the owner-
spouse has a controlling interest in the business. 17 Where the owner-
spouse lacks control over the business, no presumption of uncompen-
sated labor or unpaid rents and profits has been made because in such
a situation, the owner-spouse would not be able to unilaterally deter-
mine the compensation level of the business's employees or determine
the manner in which the business's profits are distributed."8 In Simplot
property. See Wisner v. Wisner 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981); In re Mar-
riage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1979); In re Marriage of Fleege,
91 Wash. 2d 324, 588 P.2d 1136 (1979). But see Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972)
(good will of husband's medical practice did not constitute property subject to division
upon divorce).
17. Compare Speer v. Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119, 525 P.2d 314 (1973) (recognizing a
community claim when the husband owned 65 percent of company's stock) with Simplot
v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 239, 526 P.2d 844 (1974) (holding that no community claim existed
where the husband owned 8.4 percent of the company's stock). See also Abraham v.
Abraham, 230 La. 78, 82, 87 So.2d 735, 739 (1956) ("It is clear that the growth and
success of the buiiness is chiefly due to the efforts of the defendant, who has been in sole
control of its management over the years .... "); Downs v. Downs, 410 So.2d 793, 798
(La. Ct. App. 1982) ("Plaintiff exercised these powers [of managing partner] throughout
the existence of the partnership and it is obvious that the growth and prosperity enjoyed
by it is largely attributable to his capable management of its affairs").
18. This article focuses on the situation in which the owner-spouse is employed or
renders services to a separately held business. In such a situation, the owner-spouse will
frequently have control. However, drawing the line regarding reimbursement of the non-
owner spouse at control does not necessarily make sense. In the small business context, a
control-oriented test would result in providing a reimbursement claim to the spouse of a
51 percent owner and not providing a reimbursement claim to the spouse of a 49 percent
owner, even though there is little reason to doubt that the 49 percent owner has the
same motives and the same amount of practical "control" as the 51 percent owner. More-
over, a spouse could avoid a reimbursement claim by structuring the business so that no
single small group of owners had control.
The real reason for the distinction based on control appears to be that courts have
been unwilling to consider providing a reimbursement claim based on the increase in
value of stock in which the owner-spouse is a minority owner and is not employed by the
business. This situation does not pose a problem in American Rule jurisdictions where
the increase in value of such stock would be separate property except that attributable to
the labor and industry of the owner-spouse. Cf. Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12,
490 P.2d 257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971). However, in Civil Rule jurisdictions, which hold
that the increase in value of separate property is community property, the abandonment
1990-91]
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v. Simplot,"s the Idaho Supreme Court held that the community did
not have a claim against the retained earnings of a corporation in
which the husband was employed, owned 8.4 percent of the stock and
was a member of the board of directors.2 0 There, the court held that
the decision of the corporate board of directors to reinvest the retained
earnings of the company or declare a dividend was a matter of business
judgment.21 The court reasoned that the husband had no legal right to
the retained earnings because those earnings were the property of the
corporation unless and until the board decided to declare a dividend.
2 2
The court declined to substitute its judgment for the board of directors
by giving the wife a claim against the retained earnings.28
The analysis of most courts changes, however, when the owner-'
spouse controls the business. As controlling owner, the owner-spouse
owes a fiduciary duty to the other owners of the business.2 ' However,
along with this added responsibility comes a greater level of discretion
of a control standard opens the door for a spouse to advance a reimbursement claim
when, for example, stock of a corporation in which the wife owns a minority interest, is
not employed by the business and has no control, increases in value due to the decision
of directors to reinvest profits rather than distribute a dividend. No reported case recog-
nizes this type of a reimbursement claim. Cf. Simplot v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 239, 526 P.2d
844 (1974).
The control standard is difficult to rationalize in relation to the question of whether
the community has a claim to the increase in value of separate property. Certainly the
increase in value of a company in which the owner-spouse lacks control could be attribu-
table to the reinvestment of business rents and profits just as easily as when the owner-
spouse has control. Part of the control distinction may be related to the fact that the
owner-spouse has not "realized" the increase in value of the non-control stock because
no dividend was declared; whereas, because of the access to profit secured by control, the
controlling stockholder has "realized" the increase in value. This distinction does not
account for the fact that at least some of the increase in value of the non-control stock
on the market may be attributable to the corporate directors' decision to reinvest profits.
That value will be "realized" when the owner-spouse sells the stock at a profit.
Another possible rationale for the control distinction may be related to the idea that
it is easier for the controlling stockholder to make decisions which would deprive the
community of the benefit of the rents and profits of the business. The reality of the stock
market, however, is that the non-controlling stockholder may limit the community's
claim to business rents and profits by carefully selecting stocks based on their growth
potential, as opposed to income potential, and because the respective businesses declare
few and small dividends. Thus, there does not seem to be any basis upon which to pre-
sume a greater intent to deprive the community of property in the situation where the
owner-spouse has control.
19. 96 Idaho 239, 526 P.2d 844 (1974).
20. Id. at 241, 526 P.2d at 846.
21. Id. at 242, 526 P.2d at 847.
22. Id. at 243, 526 P.2d at 848.
23. Id.
24. See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 4.1 (1986).
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regarding the distribution or retention of dividends and the determina-
tion of salary. In fact, as long as the controlling-owner spouse does not
breach his or her fiduciary duty, he or she is entitled to set his or her
own rate of compensation with virtually no outside interference.2 5 In
addition, the controlling-owner spouse, subject to fiduciary duties, may
determine by himself or herself whether to pay dividends.
On the other hand, in the situation where the owner-spouse is a
minority owner, he or she would have to rely on his or her ability to
persuade the managers and/or the majority owners of the business to
pay a dividend or increase his or her salary. Thus, the minority-owner
spouse would be in a position similar to that of a non-owner employee
or minority stockholder of a larger corporation.
The problem is not necessarily that the owner-spouse will pur-
posefully use .the corporation to shelter his or her income from commu-
nity claims. While that is part of the underlying concern, "6 a greater
risk is that, in the normal process of running the business, the owner-
spouse will retain earnings and depress his or her salary in order to
maximize profitability at the expense of the community. This behavior
has the inadvertent effect of allowing the owner-spouse to underwrite
the business's success through the indirect use of community assets. In
many instances, had the owner-spouse not made these decisions, the
business might not have been as profitable or even might have failed.
Moreover, the stabilization and profitability of the business may very
likely inure to the benefit of the community while the marital relation-
ship is intact in the form of a larger salary and more benefits for the
owner-spouse. Such sacrifices are usually made by married couples as a
form of investment in the future economic well-being of the family.
However, courts should not use this reasoning as a justification to ig-
nore the community's investment in the success of the business when
the marital relationship ends. Instead, the community should be enti-
tled to a reimbursement for those contributions to and investments in
the success of the business.
Most community-property jurisdictions-American Rule or Civil
Rule-have recognized that where the owner-spouse has not compen-
sated himself or herself for labor contributed to the separate-property
business, some of the increase in value of the business is attributable to
25. Id. at § 4.1 and § 6.1 - 6.3.
26. See e.g. Dillingham v. Dillingham, 434 S.W. 2d 459 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (hold-
ing that a corporation was the alter ego of the husband where he was the only stock-
holder, conducted all his business affairs through the corporation and co-mingled
corporate funds with community funds).
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the owner-spouse's labor and have permitted a claim for reimburse-
ment of that unpaid compensation."
A. American Rule Jurisdictions
In most American Rule jurisdictions, courts have treated the com-
munity's claim to apportionment to increases in value the same regard-
less of whether the separate-property business is incorporated or
unincorporated.2 8 Although the American Rule jurisdictions do not rec-
ognize a community interest in the rents and profits of separate prop-
erty, most have held that where the increase in value of the separate
property is the result of community management, labor or services, the
community is entitled to be reimbursed for that contribution.9 The
Nevada Supreme Court in Johnson v. Johnson0 expressed the basis
for the American Rule jurisdiction analysis of this issue:
Profit or increase in value of property may result from the cap-
ital investment itself, or from the labor, skill and industry of
one or both of the spouses or from the investment of separate
property and the labor and skill of the parties. Where both fac-
tors contribute to the increase in value of a business, that in-
crease should be apportioned between the separate and
community property. 1
27. See e.g. Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 52-53 ,601 P.2d 1334, 1336 (1979) (en
banc) (recognizing that the increase in value of separate property could be "due to the
inherent nature of the property" and/or "the individual toil and application" of the
owner-spouse); Lucini v. Lucini, 97 Nev. 213, 214-15, 626 P.2d 269, 270 (1981) (appor-
tioning increase in value of separate property between community and separate owner-
ship); Gillespie v. Gillespie, 84 N.M. 618, 623, 506 P.2d 775, 780 (1973) ("there must be a
fair apportionment between the return on the separate property ... and the value of
the labor, industry and skill" of the owner-spouse); Speer v. Quinlan, 96 Idaho 119, 128,
525 P.2d 314, 323 (1973) (holding that the increase in value of a separate-property busi-
ness must be apportioned between the community and separate estates); LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. art. 2368 (West 1985) (applied in Phillips v. Wagner, 470 So.2d 262, 268-69 (La. Ct.
App. 1985)).
Wisconsin has not yet addressed the question of apportioning increases in value of a
separate-property business. See generally, Oldham, Separate Property Businesses that
Increase in Value During Marriage, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 585.
28. Compare Gillespie v. Gillespie, 84 N.M. 618, 506 P.2d 775 (1973) (partnership);
Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 601 P.2d 1334 (1979) (en banc) (sole proprietorship);
Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909) (sole proprietorship); with Lucini v.
Lucini, 97 Nev. 213, 626 P.2d 269 (1981) (corporation); Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal.
App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921) (corporation); and Logan v. Forster, 114 Cal. App. 2d 587, 250
P.2d 730 (1952) (corporation).
29. See note 27 supra, and cases cited therein.
30. 89 Nev. 244, 510 P. 2d 625 (1973).
31. Id. at 246, 510 P.2d at 626.
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B. Civil Rule Jurisdictions
In Civil Rule jurisdictions, where the rents and profits generated
from separate-property are community property, courts have reached
different results in evaluating whether the community has a property
interest in the earnings of a separate-property business depending on
whether the business is incorporated. 2
Some Civil Rule jurisdictions have recognized that the profits of a
separately owned unincorporated business are community property. In
Swope v. Swope,35 the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the claim of
the non-owner spouse to the retained earnings of a partnership even
though the underlying partnership interest was separate property. The
court analogized the retained earnings of the separate-property part-
nership to a certificate of deposit purchased before marriage but not
redeemable until after marriage. It reasoned that "[t]he interest in-
come on such a certificate would clearly constitute community prop-
erty . . .even though it accumulates and is not distributed to the
owner/spouse. ' 34 Furthermore, the court reasoned that retained earn-
ings in a partnership could not be treated the same as retained earn-
ings in a corporation; while a stockholder in a corporation has no
property rights in the accumulated earnings and surplus of the corpo-
ration because the corporation is a separate legal entity, an owner of a
partnership interest has a right to direct payment of earnings or dis-
solve the partnership if the other partners disagree." Moreover, the
court reasoned that in contrast to a corporation, a partnership has no
distinct legal status apart from the individual partners."6 For these rea-
sons, the court in Swope concluded that the retained earnings of a
partnership, being owned by the partner/spouse directly, were commu-
32. Compare Swope v. Swope, 112 Idaho 974, 739 P.2d 273 (1987) (partnership);
Downs v. Downs, 410 So.2d 793 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (partnership); Josephson v. Joseph-
son, 115 Idaho 1142, 772 P.2d 314 (Ct. App. 1989); and Simplot v. Simplot, 96 Idaho 239,
526 P.2d 844 (1974). But see text accompanying notes 74-91, infra, for a discussion of the
approaches of Texas and Louisiana to this issue. Wisconsin courts apparently have not
yet addressed the issue.
33. 112 Idaho 974, 739 P.2d 273 (1987).
34. Id. at 980, 739 P. 2d at 279.
35. Id. at 981, 739 P.2d at 280. The court's analysis of the nature of a partner's
property interest is consistent with the existence of an "at will" partnership. See UNI-
FORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 31 (1914). However, if the partnership is for a term of years, a
partner cannot unilaterally force a dissolution of the partnership without breaching the
partnership agreement. See id.
36. Swope, 112 Idaho at 981, 739 P.2d at 280.
1990-91]
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nity property subject to division on divorce.37 The same result has oc-
curred when the owner-spouse's business is a sole proprietorship. 8
The Swope court's analysis of the differences between a partner-
ship and a corporation over-simplifies the problem. First, the analysis,
by focusing on the ownership rights of individual partners, disregards
the partnership entity.3 9 Second, the analysis does not pay close
enough attention to the nature of the property rights each partner has
in the partnership. Under the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA),' a
partner is accorded three types of property rights: "(1) his specific
rights in partnership property, (2) his interest in the partnership, and
(3) his right to participate in the [partnership) management.""' With
respect to part one, the partner's rights in specific' partnership prop-
erty, the partner may only possess partnership property for partner-
ship purposes, his rights are not assignable, they are not subject to
attachment or execution for non-partnership obligations and they do
not survive the partner's death."'
The partner's "interest in the partnership" is defined by the UPA
as "his share of the profits and surplus . . . ."" While this interest is
assignable, the only way a partner could realize this interest against
the wishes of the other partners is to force a dissolution."' If the part-
nership is for a term of years, as opposed to at-will, such an act by the
partner would constitute a breach of the partnership agreement."5 If
the dissolution of the partnership is a breach of the partnership agree-
ment, the breaching partner may be liable for damages and will lose his
or her right to the good will of the partnership. 6 If the dissolution
37. Id.
38. Cf Josephson v. Josephson, 115 Idaho 1142, 1147-48, 772 P.2d 1236, 1241 (Ct.
App. 1989); Vallone v. Vallone, 644 S.W. 2d 455, (Tex. 1982).
39. The drafters of the Uniform -Partnership Act waffled on the question of
whether the partnership should be a juridical entity. However, they incorporated many
aspects of the entity concept into the Act. See Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uni-
form Partnership Act an Aggregate or an Entity, 16 VAND. L. REV. 377, 380
(1963)("[t]he uncontradictable result of the clear language of the act [is to make] the
partnership a juridical person in substantive law ....").
40. The UPA has been adopted in all community-property jurisdictions except
Louisiana. See ARIZ. REV. STAT..ANN. §§ 29-201 to -214 (1989); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-301 to -
343 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87.010 to -430 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
25.04.010 to .430 (1989); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15001 - 15045 (West 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§8 54-1-1 to -1-43 (1988); WiS. STAT..§§ 178-01 to -39 (West 1989).
41. UPA § 24 (1914).
42. Id. § 25 (1914).
43. Id. § 26 (1914).
44. See A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERO ON PARTNERSHIP § 75 (1968).
45. UPA §§ 32(1)d) and (2)(b) (1914).
46. Id. § 38 (1914).
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results in the business being unable to continue operations, the value
of the partnership as a going concern may be significantly affected. All
of these concerns limit the practical ability of a partner to force a dis-
tribution of partnership rents and profits. Thus, as a practical matter,
there is little justification for treating partnerships and corporations
differently as to a community-property claim for undistributed
profits.
47
With respect to incorporated businesses, in Civil Rule jurisdictions
most courts have recognized that the community has a claim for un-
compensated labor.48 However, with the possible exception of Idaho,
these jurisdictions have not recognized the community's claim for un-
distributed profits. 9
III. VALUING THE COMMUNITY'S INTEREST IN THE
NATURAL INCREASE OF THE SEPARATE-PROPERTY
BUSINESS
A. American Rule Jurisdictions
1. California
Two California decisions have governed the valuation of the com-
munity-property interest in separate-property businesses in most Civil
Rule jurisdictions. In Pereira v. Pereira,50 the California Supreme
Court held that in order to determine the community interest in a sep-
arate-property business managed by one spouse, the court should allo-
cate a fair rate of return to the separate-property investment as
separate property, and any excess in profits should be community
property.8 1 The Pereira test protects the separate-property capital by
guaranteeing a reasonable rate of return on that capital. However, it
has the effect of permitting the community to retain the benefits of a
windfall return as well as placing the risk of no return on the
community.
52
47. For a thorough discussion of the relationship between community-property law
and partnerships in Texas, see Note, Community Property Rights and the Business
Partnership, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1018 (1979).
48. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 92 - 105 and accompanying text.
50. 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909)
51. Id. at 7, 103 P. at 491. See Beam v. Bank of America, 6 Cal. 3d 12, 490 P.2d
257, 98 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1971).
52. See Beam, 6 Cal. 3d at 18, 490 P.2d at 261, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 141. For an ex-
tended and thoughtful analysis of the Pereira test see Bodenheimer, The Community
Without Community Property: The Need for Legislative Attention to Separate Prop-
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The Pereira approach for valuing the community interest in a sep-
arate-property business has been used in cases where the chief contrib-
uting factor to the gain or loss of the separate property is the personal
skill, industry and labor of the owner-spouse.53 Some Civil Rule juris-
dictions, however, have been reluctant to apply the Pereira test appar-
ently out of a concern that the application of the test would result in
converting proceeds of the separate-property capital into community
property when the community has been adequately compensated for
its contributions to. the increase in value of the separate-property
business. 4
In a second California case, Van Camp v. Van Camp,5" an appel-
late court allocated a portion of the profits of a separate-property busi-
ness as the reasonable value of the owner-spouse's services and treated
the balance of the increase in value as separate property.56 In contrast
to the Pereira approach, Van Camp fixed a value for the services con-
tributed to the separate-property business by the owner-spouse. Thus,
Van Camp protected the community by ensuring that a fair return on
community labor would be received. However, it limited the claim of
the community by placing the benefits of windfall profits on the sepa-
rate-property estate as well as the risk of loss on the separate-property
estate. The Van Camp test has been applied in cases where the chief
contributing factor to the profit or loss on the separate property is the
capital itself.
5 7
California courts apply one or the other of the above tests depend-
ing on which would accomplish "substantial justice" on the facts of an
individual case, considering whether the profits result from the charac-
ter of the capital investment in the property or the labor, skill and
industry of the owner-spouse. 58
erty Marriages Under Community Property Laws, 8 Cal W.L. Rev. 381, 386-95, 401-403
(1972) [hereinafter Bodenheimer].
53. See Beam, 6 Cal. 3d at 18, 490 P.2d at 261, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
54. Lucini v. Lucini, 97 Nev. 213, 215, 626 P.2d 269, 270-71 (1981) (holding that
apportionment of the increase in a separate-property partnership is a proper way of
achieving substantial justice between the parties), Gillespie v. Gillespie, 84 N. M. 618,
624, 506 P. 2d 775, 781 (1973)("With the value of the services and efforts being estab-
lished and not challenged, and all of those monies having been withdrawn from the busi-
ness, it is difficult to see how there could have been a community interest still in the
business").
55. 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921)
56. Id. at 27-28, 199 P. at 888-89. See Beam, 6 Cal. 3d at 19, 490 P. 2d at 141, 98
Cal. Rptr. at 261. See Bodenheimer, supra note 52 at 395 - 401.
57. Beam, 6 Cal.3d at 18, 490 P.2d at 141, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
58. Logan v. Forster 114 Cal. App. 2d 587, 596-600, 250 P.2d 730, 737-38 (1952);
Beam, 6 Cal. 3d at 19-20, 490 P.2d at 262, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
[Vol. 27
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
One of the problems with the California approach is that it does
not provide much guidance on when Pereira and Van Camp should be
applied. One California decision suggested that where the labor and
industry of the owner-spouse had a minor influence on the increase in
value of the separate property, the Van Camp approach should be ap-
plied.5 9 This reasoning is presumably based on the assumption that the
Van Camp approach would permit the court to establish a very low
figure for the compensation due the owner-spouse to reflect his or her
minor influence. While this reasoning is attractive, it is not easily ap-
plied where the influence of the owner-spouse's labor on the increase in
profits is difficult to evaluate. In fact, where the separate property is
highly capital intensive, it seems that the Pereira test would be appro-
priate since that test would place the risk of loss on the community by
establishing a fixed rate of return for the capital investment.60
Furthermore, with respect to the Van Camp test, the California
courts have provided little guidance on what constitutes a reasonable
return on community labor. For example, should the rate of return be
based solely on what the business would have had to pay a third party
to*manage the business? Does it consider the entrepreneurial skills of
the spouse? Several commentators have observed that focusing on
what a non-owner employee would have been paid will frequently
under-value the community contribution to the business. 1
In addition, the California approach, especially when the Pereira
test is applied, does not seem to focus on the right question. Because
the community's claim in an American Rule jurisdiction arises only as
a result of the labor and industry of the owner-spouse, the courts
should directly focus on valuing that labor and industry. This question
should turn on the nature and extent of the services rendered. While
Van Camp allows such an inquiry, the Pereira test does not adequately
consider the services rendered to the separate-property business. Fi-
nally, courts have had difficulty determining what is a reasonable rate
59. In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d 93, 105, 113 Cal. Rptr. 58, 65 (1974).
60. Commentators have gone to great lengths to establish when Van Camp or Per-
eira should be applied. See, e.g. Adler, Arizona's All-or-Nothing Approach to the Classi-
fication of Gain from Separate Property: High Time for a Change, 20 ARIz. LAW REV.
597, 609-613 (1978).
61. W. BROCKELBANK, THE COMMUNrY PROPERTY LAW OF IDAHO 176-77 (1962)
("The employed manager watches the clock. He is interested in what he can get out of it.
In contrast the husband puts his whole being into the enterprise . . ... At least it is
certain that the wages one would pay a hired manager are not the fair value of the vigi-
lant and extraordinary services of the spouse."); Bodenheimer, supra note 52 at 396
("The wages that would be paid a hired manager as well as the self-determined salary




of return on the capital investment of the owner-spouse and, as a re-
sult, have frequently applied a pre-set interest rate. 2
Professor Brigitte Bodenheimer commenting about the California
apportionment system, concluded: "Generally speaking, however, the
results are uncertain and unpredictable, often unfair to either the hus-
band or the wife-under present societal conditions more often the
wife. Thus, it is probably no overstatement to say that present appor-
tionment mechanisms are not working." 3 Despite these problems,
most American Rule jurisdictions have followed the California
approach."
2. Washington
Washington is the only American Rule jurisdiction that does not
follow the California apportionment system. With respect to an incor-
porated business, the Washington Supreme Court in Hamlin v. Mer-
lino 5 held that "where a salary is paid to the husband by [the
separate-property corporation], ... the community is thereby com-
pensated for his services, and . . . dividends paid or any enhanced
value of the stock resulting from profits reinvested in the corporation
are separate property."8 " This approach has been referred to as a seg-
regation approach;"' that is, the owner-spouse's payment of salary to
himself or herself is, by itself, sufficient evidence that community
funds have been segregated from separate-property profits. The court
in Hamlin recognized that "where a husband owning a large corpora-
tion pays to the community a salary which is grossly unfair, such salary
should be disregarded with the result that profits accruing partly from
community labors and partly from natural increase of the separate
property will be held to be commingled and community property." 8
On the facts of the case, however, the court refused to find that the
husband's salary of $1,858 per year was grossly unfair even though the
62. Bodenheimer, supra note 52, at 401-403; King, The Challenge of Apportion-
ment, 37 WASH. L: REV. 483, 487-90 (1962).
63. Bodenheimer, supra note 52, at 394.
64. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 104 N.M. 205, 719 P. 2d 432 (Ct. App. 1986); Gillespie v.
Gillespie, 84 N.M. 618, 506 P. 2d 775 (1973); Lucini v. Lucini, 97 Nev. 213, 626 P. 2d 269
(1981); Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 601 P. 2d.1334 (1979) (en banc).
65. 44 Wash. 2d 851, 272 P. 2d 125 (1954).
66. Id. at 859, 272 P. 2d at 129.
67. W. REPPY & C SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 138-39 (2d
ed. 1982) [hereinafter REPPY & SAMUEL]; Adler, supra note 60 at 604, 606-609.
68. Hamlin, 44 Wash. 2d at 860, 272 P. 2d at 129 (emphasis in original).
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value of the assets of the husband's grocery business were between
$72,000 and $133,000.69
Washington's approach on unincorporated businesses appears to
be that the community has a claim for the enhancement in value of the
separate property that results from community labor."0 However, in or-
der to establish that claim, the community must rebut the presump-
tion that the increases in value of separate property are due to natural
forces and consequently are separate property.7"
Washington's approach is, in some ways, akin to the "all or noth-
ing" approach which at one time was followed in Arizona and Ne-
vada.7 2 Washington's approach discourages apportionment of increases
in the value of separate property between community and separate es-
tates. In most cases, Washington will not recognize a community claim
in the increase in value of a separate-property business where that bus-
iness is incorporated.. Even in the case of an unincorporated business,
the approach of the Washington courts would only permit apportion-
ment when the non-owner spouse could overcome a presumption to the
contrary and prove that the value of the separate property was en-
hanced by community labor.
B. Civil Rule Jurisdictions
1. Louisiana
The Louisiana Civil Code article 2368 appears to limit the commu-
nity's claim to the increased value of a separate-property business to
that amount attributable to the "uncompensated labor and industry of
the spouses."' "7 Thus, even though the general rule in Louisiana is that
the proceeds of separate property are community,74 the civil code does
69. Id.
70. Id. at 858, 272 P.2d at 129 ("[w]here the separate property in question is ...
an unincorporated business with which personal services ostensibly belonging to the
community have been combined, the rule is that all the income or increase will be con-
sidered as community property in the absence of a contemporaneous segregation of the
income between the community and the separate estates.") (emphasis in original).
71. See id. at 858, 272 P. 2d at 129, modified by Matter of Marriage of Elam, 97
Wash. 2d 811, 650 P.2d 213 (1982).
72. See Adler, 20 ARiz. L. REV. 597 (1978)(Arizona abandoned this approach in
Cockrill v. Cockrill, 124 Ariz. 50, 601 P.2d 1334 (1979) (en banc); Nevada abandoned it in
Johnson v. Johnson, 89"Nev. 244, 510 P.2d 625 (1973)).
73. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2368 (West 1985).
74. Id. art. 2339 (West 1985) provides: "The natural and civil fruits of the separate
property of a spouse, minerals produced from or attributable to a separate asset, and




not appear to permit reimbursement for undistributed profits of a sep-
arate-property business that has increased in value. Furthermore, the
comments to article 2368 appear to provide that if the owner-spouse is
compensated for his or her labor, then the community has no claim for
reimbursement.
7 5
Consistent with the provisions of article 2368, the Louisiana courts
have held that the value of the community claim against the increase
in value of a separate-property business is measured by whether the
owner-spouse was adequately compensated.7 6 In Phillips v. Wagner,7 a
Louisiana appellate court held that the community had no claim to the
increase in value of a separate-property partnership because, although
the husband was one of two partners, he was not directly employed by
the partnership and consequently his "common labor" did not contrib-
ute to the increase in value.
7 8
Under the predecessor of article 2368,'7 the Louisiana Supreme
Court took the view that if common labor, industry or expenses con-
tributed to the increase in value, then the entire increase was treated
as community property.80 Through a literal application of the former
provisions, the court held that the separate estate had to establish that
the increase in value resulted only from the ordinary course of things.8 1
The language of the revised article appears to reverse this all-or-noth-
75. The comment to article 2368 provides in relevant part: "Under this provision,
when separate property has increased in value due to the uncompensated common labor
and industry of either spouse, the other spouse is entitled to one-half of the increase. To
the extent that a spouse is compensated for his labor no reimbursement is due." LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 2368 (West 1982), comment.
76. Under an earlier version of article 2368, Louisiana appears to have applied an
"all or nothing" approach to the apportionment of the increase in value of a separate
property business. See notes 79-81, infra and accompanying text; Abraham v. Abraham,
230 La. 78, 82, 87 So.2d 735, 738-39 (1956).
77. 470 So. 2d 262 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
78. Id. at 268.
79. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2408 (1870) (repealed by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627) (as cited in
Bartke, The Reform of the Community Property System of Louisiana-A Response to
Its Critics, 54 TuL. L. REv. 294 (1980)) provided in relevant part:
When the separate property of either the husband or the wife has been in-
creased or improved during the marriage, the other spouse or his or her heirs,
shall be entitled to the reward of one half of the increase or amelioration, if it
be proved that the increase or amelioration be the result of the common labor,
expenses or industry; but there shall be no reward due if it be proved that the
increase is due only to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in the value
of property, or to the chances of trade. (emphasis added).
80. Abraham v. Abraham, 230 La. 78, 87 So.2d 735 (1956).
81. See supra note 79. The express language of article 2408 appears to have re-




ing approach by expressly eliminating the clause of the original statute
relating to increases in value of the ordinary course of things and by
providing expressly that "the spouse whose property has increased in
value [must reimburse the other spouse in the amount of] one-half of
the increase attributed to the common labor."8 2
Because of the limitation of the Louisiana Civil Code as to in-
creases in value of a separate-property business, Louisiana effectively
takes the same approach as an American Rule jurisdiction. The only
basis for a community claim in a separate-property business is uncom-
pensated- community labor and industry. Moreover, if the language of
the comments to article 2368 is given literal effect, it would appear
that Louisiana's approach is akin to that of Washington,"3 since the
payment of compensation to the owner-spouse by the separate-prop-




Like Washington, Texas appears to treat the increase in value of a
separate-property business differently depending upon whether the
business is incorporated. With respect to an incorporated separate-
property business, the Texas Supreme Court has limited the commu-
nity claim to that portion of the increase attributable to uncompen-
sated labor and industry of the spouses."s In Jensen v. Jensen,"8 that
court held that the community should be reimbursed for the value of
82. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2368 (West 1985) (emphasis added). See Reppy, The
Uniform Marital Property Act: Some Suggested Revisions for a Basically Sound Act, 21
HOUSTON L. REV. 679, 700-701 n. 102 (1984) [hereinafter Reppy].
83. See, supra, text accompanying notes 65 - 72.
84. Commentators discussing the extensive 1980 revision of Louisiana's commu-
nity-property laws curiously do not mention the abandonment of the statutory provision
forcing the separate estate to establish that increases resulted only from the ordinary
course of things. Nor do they discuss the language of the comment which appears to bar
a community claim if the community labor was compensated. See Riley, Analysis of the
1980 Revision of the Matrimonial Regimes Law of Louisiana, 26 LOYOLA L. REV. 453,
517-19 (1980); Bartke, The Reform of the Community Property System in Louisiana-A
Response to its Critics, 54 TULANE L. REv. 294 (1980); Community Property
Symposium,
39 LA. L. REV. 323 (1979).
85. For an excellent analysis of the Texas Supreme Court's struggle with this issue
over the years, see, Comment, Closely Held Corporations in the Wake of Vallone: En-
hancement of Stock Value by Community Time, Talent and Labor, 35 BAYLOR L. REV.
47, 49-67 (1983).
86. 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984) [hereinafter Jensen III]. Prior to this opinion, the
Texas Supreme Court issued and withdrew two conflicting opinions in this case. See
Jensen v. Jensen, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 480 (July 6, 1983) and Jensen v. Jensen, 27 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 68 (Nov. 9, 1983).
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the time and/or effort expended by either spouse on the separate-prop-
erty business, less compensation received in the form of .salary, bo-
nuses, dividends or other benefits.8 7 This holding does not appear to
provide any basis for reimbursement to the community of undistrib-
uted corporate profits, even though Texas is a Civil Rule jurisdiction
recognizing generally that rents and profits on separate property are
community property.88
With respect to unincorporated business profits, Texas may not
recognize apportionment. Instead, Texas has developed a set of "all-or-
nothing" rules based on the nature of the underlying business prop-
erty.89 However, in her dissent in Vallone v. Vallone,90 Justice Sondock
suggested that the increase in value of a sole proprietorship would be
community property.91
3. Idaho
In Speer v. Quinlan,92 the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that a
non-owner spouse should be reimbursed for uncompensated labor
where the owner-spouse was not paid adequate compensation. 3 The
measure of adequate compensation was set forth as follows:
87. 665 S.W.2d at 109. One commentator described the law of Texas after Vallone
and Jensen as follows:
The formula [for valuing the community's claim to reimbursement] consists of
four steps. First, determine how much of the appreciated value is attributable
to the efforts and talents of either spouse. . .. Second, calculate what compen-
sation would be adequate for the services rendered by the owner spouse ...
Third, subtract some portion of the spousal services necessary to maintain and
preserve the separate estate .... Fourth, offset all compensation previously
received during marriage (such as salaries, bonuses and fringe benefits) against
the amount necessary to reimburse the community.
Smith, supra note 1 at 718 - 719.
88. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15, as amended 1987. Smith, supra note 1 at 718
("The concept of 'adequate compensation' ignores the basic definition of earnings as
community property.")
89. These rules are described and criticized in REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 67 at
155 ("Texas seems not to realize that a civil law system has an apportionment problem.
The Texas courts have categorized cases presenting apportionment problems and devel-
oped all-or-nothing rules for each category. The 'rules,' if they can be called that, are
irreconcilable and without logic.").
90. 644 S.W. 2d 455 (Tex. 1982).
91. Id. at 462 ("If Tony's Restaurant, Inc. had continued its operation as a sole
proprietorship, the form in which it was originally organized during the marriage, there
could be no doubt that the entire increase in value of the business would be community
property.")(footnote omitted)(Sondock, J., dissenting); see also Note, Community Prop-
erty and the Business Partnership, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1018 (1979).
92. 96 Idaho 119, 525 P. 2d 314 (1973).
93. Id. at 128, 525 P.2d at 323.
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In determining whether the community has been adequately
compensated for its labor over the period of the marriage, the
trial court should take the following factors into consideration:
the nature of the business, the size of the business, the number
of employees, the nature and extent of community involvement
in the conduct of the business, the growth pattern of the busi-
ness. (Did it steadily enhance in value? Did periods of prosper-
ity alternate with periods of decline?) Once these questions are
answered the proper inquiry is whether the over-all compensa-
tion received by the community for its contribution to the con-
duct of the business was equivalent to the compensation which
the business would have had to pay to secure a non-owner em-
ployee to perform the same services which were rendered by
the community. 4
The court concluded that the community should be entitled to a judg-
ment against the owner-spouse in the amount of the difference be-
tween the compensation actually received and the compensation which
the community would have received if the owner-spouse had been ade-
quately compensated.9 5
In addition to its holding regarding compensation for community
labor, the Idaho court, in contrast to Louisiana and Texas, addressed
the problem of whether the community had a claim for undistributed
rents and profits of separate property. The court concluded that the
community had no ownership rights to undistributed business profits
of a corporation where the decision of the corporate directors to retain
earnings was an exercise of reasonable business judgment and where
there was no intent to defraud the community.9 6 Nonetheless, the court
recognized that, but for the fact of incorporation, the owner-spouse's
share of those undistributed earnings would have been community
property.9 7 Curiously, the court, although recognizing the "inequity" of
the situation, did not provide a claim for reimbursement of undistrib-
uted business profits to the non-owner spouse. Instead, the court di-
rected the trial court to consider the "inequity" as one factor in
dividing the community property; under the equitable-division prop-
erty settlement statute.98 This latter holding in the Speer case is more
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id at 129, 525 P.2d at 324.
97. Id. See Swope v. Swope, 112 Idaho 974, 739 .P.2d 273 (1987).
98. Id. Professor Reppy has suggested, citing Speer, that Idaho "ignore[s] the cor-
porate form when a spouse owns more than fifty percent of the stock." Reppy, supra
note 82, at 703, n. 111-112. This is an inaccurate summary of Speer which expressly
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doctrinally supportable than the Texas approach of completely ignor-
ing the potential community claim for undistributed profits, nonethe-
less it is problematical for two reasons. First, the decision does not
make clear the basis for the different treatment of uncompensated
community labor and undistributed rents and profits; for the former,
the community receives a judgment, while the latter is merely a factor
to be considered in making an unequal division of community prop-
erty. If no other community assets -exist, -the Speer analysis would
leave the non-owner spouse with no remedy for the undistributed cor-
porate profits. Second, by relying on the equitable-division statute and
not recognizing that the surviving spouse -has a right to reimbursement
of the undistributed profits, the court provided no basis for the non-
owner spouse's heirs to obtain reimbursement upon that spouse's
death. Even with these problems, Speer stands alone in recognizing
that in a Civil Rule jurisdiction, undistributed business profits raise a
question of community-property characterization and/or
reimbursement.
The problem in Idaho is that despite Speer, the community claims
appear to be limited to uncompensated labor when the business is in-
corporated. Even though later courts have addressed the inequity of
not compensating the community for undistributed profits, they have
not clearly articulated the claim for profits as distinct from the claim
for uncompensated labor. In Josephson v. Josephson," the Idaho
Court of Appeals, relying on Speer, recognized that dividends, if they
had been distributed, would have been community property. 00 How-
ever, despite its recognition of the potential community interest in un-
distributed dividends, the court concluded: "[A] proper inquiry is
whether community efforts . . were adequately rewarded through sal-
ary."'' Furthermore, the court, apparently combining the two distinct
parts of Speer into one test, concluded that the business's retention of
earnings and failure to distribute a-dividend should be considered in
the context of whether the owner-spouse's salary was adequate. 02
rejected the argument that the community had a property interest in the retained earn-
ings of a separate-property business. Not only did the Speer court reject the direct claim
against retained earnings, but, as to undistributed rents -and profits of a separate-prop-
erty business, the court did not even recognize that the non-owner spouse had a claim for
reimbursement. 96 Idaho at 129-30, 525 P.3d -at -324-25.
99. 115 Idaho 1142, 772 P.2d 1236 (Ct. App. 1'989)





In Wolford v. Wolford,10 8 the Idaho Supreme Court perpetuated
the confusion begun in Josephson. There, the court could have dis-
posed of the entire case based on an antenuptial agreement between
the parties.10 4 Instead, however, the court treated the case as governed
by Speer and apparently limited its decision to a compensation
analysis:
Thus, under the analysis contained in Speer, whenever one
party to a marriage claims that he or she is entitled to share in
the increase in the value of a separate property business in
which one of the parties was an employee during the marriage,
the proper inquiry upon dissolution of the marriage is whether
the community has been adequately compensated for its
labor.1"'
IV. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE COMMUNITY
INTEREST IN UNDISTRIBUTED INCREASES IN A
SEPARATE-PROPERTY BUSINESS: REIMBURSEMENT VS.
OWNERSHIP
When courts have recognized the community's claim to increases
in value of a separate-property business whether based on uncompen-
103. 117 Idaho 61i 785 P.2d 625 (1990). For a detailed analysis of the Wolford deci-
sion see Note, Community Claims in Separate Property, 27 IDAHo L. Rav. 127 (1991).
104. Wolford, 117 Idaho at 66, 785 P.2d at 630 ("Since... [the parties] entered
into that comprehensive antenuptial agreement, which the courts below found to have
been voluntarily entered into without fraud or duress, our analysis of the issues in this
case will be made with that contractual property regime in mind") (emphasis added). In
a footnote the court observed:
The antenuptial agreement provided that "[e]ach party shall separately retain
all rights and have complete control of his or her own separate property,
whether now owned or hereafter acquired and the rents, profits, and increase
thereon .... with the same effect as if no marriage had been consummated
between them." It may well be that under the property regime contracted be-
tween the parties in their ante-nuptial agreement that neither party was enti-
tled to any interest in the "increase" in their separate property, regardless of
whether that increase was the result of the personal efforts of David. We need
not resolve that question, however, since we agree with the district court's
analysis that, even assuming that the ante-nuptial agreement did not preclude
Kathryn from claiming an interest in David's separate property stock in
CommTek, Inc., the uncontradicted evidence in the record demonstrates that
the community was adequately compensated, and therefore under Speer v.
Quinlan, the community has no claim against David's separate property stock
in CommTek, Inc.
Id. at 67-68, 785 P.2d at 631-32, n.3 (emphasis added),
105. Id. at 68, 785 P.2d at 632. See Note, 27 IDAHO L. REy. 127.
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sated salary or undistributed profits, that claim has been characterized
most often as one for reimbursement. 10 6 In Jensen v. Jensen107 the
Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the nature of the
community claim was one for ownership or reimbursement and held
that the claim was a reimbursement claim.108 The Louisiana Civil Code
provides for a reimbursement claim. 09
Professor Oldham has suggested that both Washington and section
14 of the Uniform Marital Property Act (UMPA), treat the community
claim as one for ownership as opposed to reimbursement. "0 Oldham
cites In re Estate of Smith as support for the proposition that Wash-
ington treats the community claim as one for ownership.' Smith held
that where personal services of one spouse have been commingled with
a separate-property business that is unincorporated and where no sal-
ary was segregated from the profits, the increase in the value of the
business is community property." 2 However, Washington is the only
community-property jurisdiction that treats cases involving the in-
crease in value of unincorporated businesses as simple improvement or
commingling cases." 3
106. See e.g. Speer, 96 Idaho at 128, 225 P. 2d at 323 (holding that on divorce, the
court should enter a judgment in favor of the non-owner spouse where compensation is
found inadequate); Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W. 2d at 109. Oldham points out that the
implication of the Pereira test is that the community's claim is one for reimbursement.
Oldham, Separate Property Businesses That Increase in Value During Marriage, 1990
Wis. L. REV. 585, 621-22.
107. 665 S.W. 2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
108. Id. at 109.
109. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2368 (West 1985).
110. Oldham, supra note 106 at 622 relying on, In re Estate of Smith, 73 Wash. 2d
629, 440 P. 2d 179 (1968) and UNIFORM MARITAL PROPERTY AcT § 14(b) (1983) [hereinaf-
ter UMPA]. Section 14(b) of the UMPA provides-in relevant part:
(b) Application by one spouse of substantial labor, effort, inventiveness, physi-
cal or intellectual skill, creativity, or managerial activity on individual property
of the other spouse creates marital property attributable to that application if:
(i) reasonable compensation is not received for the application; and (ii) sub-
stantial appreciation of the individual property of the other spouse results
from the application.
The UMPA is a community-property statute which substitutes the term "marital prop-
erty" for "community property" and the term "individual property" for the term "sepa-
rate property." Kornfield, Uniform Marital Property Act-Prepatory Note, 4 Equit.
Distribution Rep. 6, 70-71 (Dec. 1983).
111. Oldham, supra note 106 at 622.
112. In re Estate of Smith, 73 Wash.2d at 630-31, 440 P.2d at 180-81.
113. Id. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of Washing-
ton's unique approach to.this problem. Although Washington has never recognized such
a claim, it appears that Washington would hold that the community interest in the in-
crease in value of an incorporated separate-property business is an ownership claim. Cf.
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Furthermore, section 14(b) of the UMPA is ambiguous."" That
provision apparently deals with a special application of commingling,
or "mixing" as the UMPA refers to it, in which one spouse "mixes" his
or her efforts with the "property of. the other spouse."' 5 In compari-
son, the enhancement in separate business property cases involve situ-
ations in which a spouse has devoted his or her effort to the
management and improvement of his or her own separate property.
Commingling cases have been treated differently-consistently giving
rise to. an ownership interest when property cannot be "uncommin-
gled""'-than the enhancement of separate business-property cases.
Conceptually, commingling is distinguishable from the situation where
separate property increases in value due to the labor and industry of
one spouse. Commingling results when separate and community prop-
erty are combined so that the owner of the separate property cannot
show how much of the mixture is separate property. In such a case the
entire amount of mixed property is treated as community property
Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wash. 2d at 858, 272 P.2d at 129. ("[The] natural increase of
separate property will be held to be commingled and community property.").
114. The meaning of the § 14(b) is subject to some debate. Oldham states, "[T]he
drafters of the Uniform Marital Property Act decided that the marital property claim
(created from services rendered toward individual property) was an ownership claim not
a reimbursement claim." Oldham, supra note 106 at 621 n.177, (citing UNIFORM MArrIAL
PROPERTY ACT § 14, comment). However, the comments to section 14 do not address the
separate-property business problem. They state in relevant part:
The section deals with another extremely important issue. It is the situation
arising from the application to the individual property of one spouse of per-
sonal effort by the other spouse... [The section] articulates a bias against the
creation of marital property from such an act unless the effort has been sub-
stantial and has been responsible for substantial appreciation... Many situa-
tions can be visualized. Real property transactions are those in which the
problem will typically occur. One spouse will bring real property into the mar-
riage. After the marriage, the real property will be an important element in the
life of the couple. The other spouse will improve it by physical labor. This
might be work on a farm, or improvements or additions to a home or to a piece
of commercial real estate.
UMPA § 14, comment.
When Wisconsin adopted the UMPA, its legislature altered the provision of § 14 to
broaden its application. Section 766.63(2) of the Wisconsin statutes provides, "Alplica-
tion of one spouse's labor, effort, inventiveness, physical or intellectual skill, creativity of
managerial activity to either spouse's property other than marital property creates mari-
tal property .. " Wis. STAT. 766.63(2) (West Supp. 1990). For a discussion of the Wis-
consin revision of § 14 see Comment, Enhanced Value of a Closely Held Corporation at
the Time of Divorce: What Role Will Wisconsin's Marital Property Act Play, 69 MARQ.
L. REV. 82, 111-115 (1985).
115. UMPA § 14b (1983) (emphasis added).
116. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 1, at § 6:8; REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 67 at 113-
14 (2d ed. 1982).
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under the commingling doctrine."' The commingling doctrine has been
viewed as a special application of the general presumption in favor of
community property which requires a person claiming that property is
separate property to establish that the property is not community
property.1 ' Commingling can result in property which was once sepa-
rate property being considered community property because it is irre-
trievably mixed with community property.
One commentator has attacked the reimbursement option as fun-
damentally unfair:
The remedy of equitable reimbursement as formulated in Val-
lone and Jensen III fails conceptually and practically to fulfill
the promise that all property acquired during marriage by ei-
ther spouse's efforts is community property. The community-
property principle of marriage as a joint venture is frustrated
as is the more recent use of the partnership principle to in-
crease the marital property distributed to the dependent
spouse upon divorce. Moreover, separate-property owners
could have been creating a successful community business if
they had not devoted their time and efforts to a separate cor-
poration. The community loses this opportunity .... 1'9
In spite of the arguments advanced above, the community claim in
the increase in value of a separate-property business should be treated
as a claim for reimbursement, as most courts have concluded, and not
as a claim for ownership. Allowing the non-owner spouse to acquire an
ownership interest in a separate-property business would create signifi-
cant problems in determining the ownership of businesses and would
undermine the management of those businesses. If the community
117. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 1, at § 6:8, 339, See also REPPY AND SAMUEL, supra
note 67, at 113-114.
118. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 1, at § 6:8, 339.
119. Smith, supra note 1, at 719. Curiously Smith seems to argue that the "equita-
ble apportionment" approach of the California case of Pereira has the potential to pro-
vide more than a reimbursement claim. She concludes, "[T]he apportionment rule can
reward a return on investments in both separate and community property, including
investments of human capital." Id. at 720. On the other hand, Oldham interprets Pereira
as implying only a reimbursement claim: "Most Pereira cases imply that the community
interest arises only at dissolution. The Pereira 'increase in value' computation normally
is conducted by comparing the value of the business at the time of the wedding to the
value at the time of divorce. A year-by-year accounting is not attempted. This procedure
suggests that the community only has a reimbursement claim that arises at dissolution."
Oldham, supra note 106 at 621. In fact, while Pereira appears to have been a reimburse-




claim is treated as giving rise to an ownership right in a business, then
questions regarding whether the spouse is a partner or stockholder in
the business with all the rights such ownership would entail would
have to be addressed. The result could be that in community-property
jurisdictions, spouses would obtain management and voting rights in
businesses. In addition, the ownership rights would belong to the
spouses after divorce and would be inheritable, divisible, and possibly
assignable. This result would subject businesses to disruption upon the
marriage or divorce of a "traditional" owner or the death of the spouse
of a "traditional" owner. These results might interfere with the func-
tioning of the business as a going concern. Moreover, as a practical
matter, such ownership rights may have little value to the non-owner
spouse. As personal property, the owner-spouse may be able to manage
the non-owner spouse's interest in the business. In addition, when the
marriage ends, an ownership right might limit the property distribu-
tion options available to the non-owner spouse. For example, if the
business is a corporation, the non-owner spouse might be left with a
distribution of a minority interest in the stock of the corporation. Such
a minority interest may have little or no market value and may not
give that spouse a meaningful say in the management of the business.
If reimbursement claims are fully recognized,2 0 the marginal addi-
tional benefits of ownership do not justify the potential problems that
would accompany ownership.
V. PROPOSAL
In both Civil and American Rule jurisdictions, the non-owner
spouse should have a reimbursement claim for unrealized compensa-
tion of the owner-spouse's services rendered to a separate-property
business based on a reasonable compensation standard. In a Civil Rule
jurisdiction, the non-owner spouse, in addition to the adequate com-
pensation claim, should also have a reimbursement claim for undistrib-
uted rents and profits of the business. These claims should be enforced
regardless of separate-property structure of the business (sole proprie-
torship, partnership or corporation).
A. Adequate Compensation
In order to determine whether the community has an interest in
the increase in value of a separate-property business as a result of un-
compensated labor and industry, courts in all community-property ju-
risdictions-American and Civil Rule-should apply a reasonable
120. See infra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
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compensation test. Such a test should consider the nature of the busi-
ness, the nature of the efforts the owner-spouse contributed to the bus-
iness and the compensation actually received by the owner-spouse in
the form of salary, bonuses and fringe benefits, if any. The original test
articulated in Speer is a thorough and well-thought-out version of the
reasonable comperlsation test.
12 1
In applying the test, courts should be careful not to place too
much emphasis on what the business would have to pay to secure a
non-owner employee to perform the services performed by the owner-
spouse. Such a non-owner employee would not have the same en-
trepreneurial commitment to the company that an owner would have.
Moreover, the services of the' owner-spouse may be such that a non-
owner employee could not be found to perform the same services. The
non-owner employee test is an attractive test because it provides court
with an objective and measurable standard by which to evaluate the
owner-spouse's compensation. However, for the reasons stated above, it
should not be the only measure of adequate compensation; therefore, a
court should consider such evidence in the context of the nature of the
business and the character of the services rendered to the business by
the owner-spouse. Moreover, no distinction ought to be made between
incorporated and unincorporated businesses. In both cases, labor of the
community may have gone uncompensated and the nature of the busi-
ness operation does not change that fact.
B. Rents and Profits
In addition to the adequate compensation test, Civil Rule jurisdic-
tions should recognize that the community has a second claim for un-
distributed profits of. a separate-property business. 122 Such profits (as
compared to appreciation in the value of the corporate assets) can be
objectively measured by a careful examination of the financial and tax
records of the corporation.12 3 In order to calculate the community's in-
terest in the undistributed profits, the court should calculate the
121. See Speer 96 Idaho at 128, 525 P.2d at 323, discussed supra notes 92-95 and
accompanying text. As to the community's claim for uncompensated labor, Speer is es-
sentially a thoughtful elaboration of the Van Camp test. See supra notes 55-57 and ac-
companying text.
122. The result is legislatively precluded in Louisiana. See, supra notes 73-84 and
accompanying text.
123. Professor Reppy has suggested that the "corporate veil" be routinely
"pierced" when the owner-spouse controls more than fifty percent of the stock even
where there are no allegations of fraud or bad faith. See Reppy, supra note 82 at 702-
705. This suggestion fails to protect the legitimate interests of minority stockholders and
is an unnecessarily invasive solution to the problem.
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owner-spouse's proportional share of the annual earnings 12 ' of the busi-
ness reduced by any unusual sources of income, such as proceeds on
the sale of equipment for each year of the marriage. That total should
be reduced by any distribution of corporate profits that took place dur-
ing the marriage. The total amount of all the undistributed profits
should also be reduced to the extent that the court, using the adequate
compensation test, determines to be withheld compensation for com-
munity labor. Finally, the amount should be reduced to the extent that
the court determines that any other stockholders employed by the cor-
poration were inadequately compensated.125 The information necessary
to complete this computation should be available .to the court in the
form of annual earnings statements and tax returns prepared using
generally accepted accounting methods. Finally, if the corporation's fi-
nancial and tax records are so inadequate that the necessary informa-
tion is not available, the court should presume that the non-owner
spouse's proportional share of all the corporate earnings during the
marriage would have been community and give the community a reim-
bursement claim-in that amount.
124. As distinguished from the value of -the corporate assets.
125. 96 Idaho at 130, 525 P.2d at 395.
1990-91]
